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Abstract 
Satellite-based QKD offers the potential to share highly secure encryption keys between optical ground stations 
all over the planet. SpooQySats is a programme for establishing the space worthiness of highly-miniaturised, 
polarization entangled, photon pair sources using CubeSat nanosatellites. The sources are being developed iteratively 
with an early version in orbit already and improved versions soon to be launched. Once fully developed, the photon 
pair sources can be deployed on more advanced satellites that are equipped with optical links. These can allow for 
very secure uplinks and downlinks and can be used to establish a global space-based quantum key distribution 
network. This would enable highly secure symmetric encryption keys to be shared between optical ground stations all 
over the planet. 
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1. Acronyms/Abbreviations
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Technology Readiness Level (TRL)
Size, Weight and Power (SWaP)
Small Photon Entangling Quantum System
(SPEQS)
2. Introduction
The ongoing development of quantum computers
threatens traditional cryptographic architectures, with 
public key cryptosystems (for example, the RSA 
algorithm [1]) particularly vulnerable [2]. Symmetric 
architectures such as the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) [3] may be able to preserve security in 
a post-quantum world at the cost of increased key sizes 
and key refresh rates, placing new emphasis on key 
management and distribution systems. Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD) seeks to address this need via a 
family of techniques based on the transmission of 
weak quantum signals, in which symmetric keys can 
be established between two or more parties in a 
manner resistant to any computational attack [4,5].  
All QKD techniques employ at least two channels 
for communication, one of which is used to transmit 
quantum signals which may be either extremely weak 
optical signals at the level of single photons [4], or 
single photons linked by the property of quantum 
entanglement [5]. This “quantum channel” is 
particularly adversely affected by channel loss, 
severely restricting the distance over which such 
techniques can be deployed terrestrially. In optical 
fibers typical transmission losses restrict QKD 
demonstrations to at most a few 100s of kilometers 
(using exotic low-loss optical fibers [6]). Over long 
enough distances, free-space transmission yields 
favourable results, though ultimately this is limited by 
line-of-sight constraints (the terrestrial record of 
144km [7] took place between island mountain 
summits). Satellite-based QKD schemes offer an 
elegant solution to these problems, and provide a clear 
pathway towards the establishment of global-scale key 
distribution networks. 
Recently, high profile QKD experiments using 
satellites have been reported [8,9] employing both 
“first generation” schemes (e.g. the BB84 protocol [4]) 
alongside the distribution of entangled photons 
between widely separated ground stations [8] – a 
prerequisite for second-generation QKD protocols. 
These experiments have attracted considerable 
attention, and demonstrate unambiguously the 
feasibility of satellite-based quantum key distribution. 
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At the National University of Singapore's Centre 
for Quantum Technologies, we have pursued an 
iterative approach to this problem, developing 
lightweight and rugged entangled photon pair sources 
with sufficiently low SWaP requirements to allow 
hosting on board “CubeSat” class nanosatellites. As 
their popularity increases, nanosatellites and the 
CubeSat platform continue to represent an attractive 
pathway towards establishing flight heritage and 
raising the technology readiness level (TRL) of 
components in our QKD system. The SpooQySat 
programme consists of a number of field tests and 
satellite missions tied to the parallel development of a 
miniature, robust and highly capable entangled photon 
source known as SPEQS [10]. 
In this paper, we briefly review proposed satellite 
QKD architectures and the progress being made at 
CQT developing and testing our quantum light sources. 
3. Satellite QKD Schemes
To share quantum encryption keys between space
and ground the quantum light source can be located on 
the ground or in space (see Figure 1 and [12]), though 
for maximum utility the source should be located in 
orbit (three out of four options in Figure 1 require this). 
Beaming photons from space-to-ground also has the 
advantage that the optical transmission path is much 
less affected by atmospheric turbulence (because the 
effects of turbulence act primarily at the end of the 
transmission, where the atmosphere is thickest) so 
optical link losses are lower [13]. Despite this, the 
perceived difficulty in operating a quantum source on-
board a satellite has led several groups to propose 
ground-to-space missions [14 - 17]. 
If scenarios 1 or 2 are used to share keys between 
two ground stations then it is required that the satellites 
be trusted parties in the key exchange (we call these 
“trusted nodes”). In contrast, scenario 3 (recently 
demonstrated in the Micius mission [8]) potentially 
enables entanglement-based QKD, removing this trust 
requirement. This is because if one photon in each pair 
of photons is beamed to Alice (at one ground station) 
and the other of the pair beamed to Bob (who is at the 
other ground station) then only Alice and Bob will 
have knowledge of the measurement outcomes and the 
key generated is private to them. They will be able to 
test this quantum exclusivity by performing a Bell 
violation test [5], and consequently need not trust the 
source. This scheme is restricted to ground stations 
simultaneously within the field-of-view of the satellite, 
and since both photons in a pair are traveling along 
high-loss paths the probability of both photons in a 
pair reaching their ground stations is very small 
(~60dB of total loss). Consequently key generation 
rates would be very slow, and indeed the recent 
demonstration of entanglement distribution by the 
Micius mission was able to achieve only slightly more 
than a single pair per second [8]. 
Figure 1- Possible satellite-based QKD implementations. 1. Ground-to-space, where the photon source is on the 
ground and the satellite only carries detectors. 2. Space-to-ground, where the satellite carries a source and detectors. 
3. A platform that can beam down to two ground stations simultaneously. 4. Inter-satellite QKD which could be the
building block for a long baseline test of quantum correlations. To enable configurations 2-4 with Bell violation-type
measurements, a source of entangled photons in space must be demonstrated. Figure reproduced from [11]. 
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4. Trusted node configuration
As detailed in the previous section, practical key
generation schemes using satellites in the near term 
will likely operate in a trusted node configuration (see 
Figure 1). In this scenario, the satellite carries out QKD 
operations with ground stations on an individual basis 
to establish independent secret keys with each of them. 
The satellite holds all keys, while the stations only 
have access to their own keys. To enable any pair of 
stations to share a common key, the satellite combines 
their respective keys KA and KB and broadcasts their 
bit-wise parity KA ⊕ KB. Since the original keys are 
independent secret strings, their bit-wise parity is a 
uniformly random string, and knowledge of the parity 
does not reveal any useful information to an adversary. 
Using this information along with knowledge of their 
own secret key, the stations can extract the opposite 
key via KA ⊕ (KA ⊕ KB)= KB and KB ⊕ (KA ⊕ KB)= 
KA.  Of course, since the satellite can access all keys, 
access to the satellite would give an adversary 
complete knowledge of any key and hence the satellite 
must be trusted. 
5. Developments at the Centre for Quantum
Technologies, National University of Singapore
While the optical links and optical ground stations
required for satellite QKD can be adapted from 
existing lasercomms systems, space-based quantum 
key sources require more development work. The most 
secure forms of QKD require entangled photon pairs, 
and CQT are developing SPEQS (the Small Photon 
Entangling Quantum System) to address the need for a 
robust, space qualified source of entanglement. SPEQS 
is being developed in iterative cycles that include 
regular on-orbit testing in CubeSats, as outlined in 
Table 1.  
The aim is to gradually raise the technology 
readiness level of the photon pair sources. Initial 
iterations developed the miniaturized electronics and 
ruggedized optics. These led onto on-orbit tests of a 
correlated photon pair source [22] (these photons are 
not entangled in polarization but may have 
entanglement in other degrees of freedom, e.g. time-
frequency). A polarization entangled version of 
SPEQS is being developed for launch in the SpooQy-
1 CubeSat in 2018 [10]. These CubeSat tests will 
establish the space worthiness of the source, but they 
do not beam photons out of the satellite to perform 
QKD. Once space worthiness is established, the first 
missions will target cases 2 and 4 from Figure 1. To 
this end, we have joined with a consortium of 
researchers and industry partners to put forward a 
proposal for a satellite-to-ground entanglement 
distribution and QKD mission (CQuCoM, [23]). This 
ambitious programme will make use of CubeSats as 
the orbiting platform, and if successful would provide 
invaluable insight into the minimal SWaP required for 
such protocols. We have also established a partnership 
with researchers at the University of New South Wales 
to produce a case study for a mission to explore 
satellite-to-satellite entanglement distribution using 
CubeSats [24]. While not yet demonstrated, we 
anticipate that inter-satellite links of this sort will be 
critical components of future QKD systems [25], 
enabling a constellation of satellites operating under 
the “trusted node” paradigm to dramatically increase 
the rate at which distant ground stations can establish 
key pairs. 
Figure 2- Illustration of the most common satellite 
QKD scheme: the downlink trusted-node. (a) A QKD 
system on-board a satellite performs a key exchange 
operation during its pass over a ground station 
(Station A), establishing a secret key pair KA. (b) The 
satellite repeats this procedure during overflight of a 
second ground receiver (Station B) establishing the 
key pair KB. (c) The satellite broadcasts the bitwise 
parity of KA and KB over a classical channel. This 
reveals no information to an adversary while enabling 
both Station A and Station B to extract the opposite 
key pair. Figure reproduced from [18]. 
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Table 1: Milestones leading to on-orbit QKD demonstrations. 
6. Conclusions
Quantum key distribution offers a technological
solution to the problem of ensuring privacy in a post-
quantum world, and seems likely to play a role in 
future cryptosystems. As QKD schemes are all reliant 
upon the transmission of quantum signals, channel loss 
represents a crucial barrier to its adoption for long-
range communications, motivating many researchers 
to propose satellite-based architectures. As recent 
technology demonstrations [8] have firmly established 
the technological feasibility of this approach, we 
continue to follow an iterative development scheme, 
working towards small and cost-effective QKD 
terminals. 
The SpooQySat programme described in this paper 
encompasses a series of high altitude and on-orbit tests 
of the miniaturized photon pair source SPEQS, and 
aims to produce a fully validated system for the 
production of entanglement in the satellite 
environment. Once this is accomplished, the source 
will be well positioned for incorporation into fully 
fledged QKD systems, either on dedicated satellite 
missions (implementing, for example the trusted node 
architecture described in Figure 2) or as QKD 
terminals to increase the capability of larger 
multifunctional platforms. We are actively developing 
international partnerships to explore opportunities in 
this area, and hope to participate in the first QKD 
missions very soon. 
Year Milestone Mission Reference 
2012 Basic miniature SPDC source. High altitude balloon 
Test 
[19] 
2013 Correlated SPDC pair source. High altitude balloon 
Test 
[20] 
2014 Space-qualified, correlated, SPDC source survives 
rocket explosion 
GomSpace GomX-2 
CubeSat 
[21] 
2016 Space-qualified, correlated, SPDC source in low 
Earth Orbit 
NUS Galassia CubeSat [22] 
2018 Demonstration of entangled photon pair source in 
space. 
CQT SpooQy-1 CubeSat [11] 
2019+ QKD demonstrations with optical links in space. International collaborations [23] 
Figure 3 Rendering of the SpooQy-1 spacecraft (with 
most solar panels and cables removed). 
Approximately 2/3 of the volume is occupied by the 
SPEQS payload. 
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